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PIMPING AND PORNOGRAPHY AS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT




In March 1989, the New York City tabloids announced a forthcoming
trial, with headlines like "Pet Peeve" and "Petulant Pet's Cry." The case
was Thoreson v. Penthouse International Ltd.I The media's characteriza-
tion of Plaintiff Marjorie Lee Thoreson, AKA Anneka DiLorenzo, a
former "Penthouse Pet," as a "girlie mag featurette" demonstrated that
they clearly viewed the lawsuit as a form of sexual entertainment.
Women Against Pornography, the New York City feminist organization
I helped found, had a different perspective. On behalf of this group, I
contacted the Plaintiff's lawyer, Murray Schwartz, and he took us up
on our offer of help. This help included lending moral support to
DiLorenzo throughout the trial and, subsequently, writing amicus briefs
at two stages of appeal on behalf of the Women's Bar Association of
the State of New York, The National Coalition Against Sexual Assault,
and other feminist organizations.
The trial, at which both DiLorenzo and Robert Guccione, the
Defendant, testified, provided a rare opportunity to study the modus
t Several issues were raised on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Thoreson
AKA DiLorenzo was the Respondent on the issue of sexual harassment and the
Appellant on the issue of the amount of damages awarded by the Supreme Court.
This portion of the brief addresses only the issue of sexual harassment. Wendy C.
Lecker (J.D. 1988, New York University School of Law), authored a section on the
issue of compensatory damages.
* Dorchen Leidholdt (J.D. 1988, New York University School of Law, M.A. 1978,
University of Virginia) is a criminal defense attorney on staff at the New York City
Legal Aid Society and is Adjunct Professor at the City University of New York
School of Law. She is a founder of Women Against Pornography and is Associate
Director of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, a non-governmental
organization in consultation with the United Nations. Her publications include
THE SExuAL. LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM (Teachers College Press
1990), which she co-edited with Janice Raymond. She is currently editing a volume
entitled THE GLOBAL Sax TRADE IN WOMEN.
1. 563 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990), aff'd, 583 N.Y.S.2d 213 (App.
Div. 1992), aff'd, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
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operandi of a sex industry kingpin. It also demonstrated how litigation
can further the speech of those who have long been silenced.
DiLorenzo, whose testimony the judge found to be thoroughly credible,
testified that she first encountered Guccione in 1973 after he appeared
on the Merv Griffin show, claiming to be a filmmaker in search of new
talent. Guccione was just beginning to launch the American edition of
Penthouse, until this time well-known only in Great Britain; DiLorenzo
was a twenty-year-old who dreamed of becoming an actress but who
had supported herself primarily by working as a cocktail waitress.
Guccione encouraged her to pose for Penthouse, personally taking the
photographs during a three-day session in the bedroom of his London
apartment. Afterwards he persuaded her to sign a management contract
that authorized him "to advise, counsel and guide the artist in the
proper development of the artist's talent and the selection and prepara-
tion of suitable entertainment material." 2 Although Guccione repeatedly
claimed to DiLorenzo throughout the next few years that he was meet-
ing with people about her acting career, the jobs he sent her out on
required little acting ability. Clad in a French maid's outfit draped with
a sash that read "Penthouse Pet," DiLorenzo traveled the country on
publicity tours promoting Penthouse, making appearances at shopping
centers and automobile shows.
In 1975, DiLorenzo was made "Pet of the Year" and placed on the
Penthouse payroll at a salary of $20o a week. At Guccione's urging, she
moved into his New York townhouse where he lived with his girlfriend,
Kathy Keeton. Working six to seven days a week until the early morn-
ing hours (although compensated for only three days' work), DiLorenzo
babysat his children, entertained his business associates, walked his dog,
and sexually serviced him.
In the beginning of 1977, Guccione began to talk to DiLorenzo
about Caligula,3 the epic movie he was planning to produce. He prom-
ised her the important role of Caligula's wife, but told her that if she
2. Record at 675-76, Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., No. 13039 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County, Oct. 23, 1990) (all cites to the record herein are those originally cited in
the brief filed with the New York Court of Appeals).
3. Intended to be Guccione's opus, Caligula was filmed in 1977. Although Caligula
was ostensibly about the life of the brutal and sadistic Roman emperor, one writer
labeled it as "a series of mechanical sexual performances of the Times Square
variety," and critics panned it. By the time the film was released in the late 1970s,
script writer Gore Vidal, director Tinto Brass, and actor Roddy McDowell had
disassociated themselves from Guccione's production. Gwenda Blair, Citizen
Guccione, ATrENZIONE, June 1981, at 53.
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wanted the part she would have to have her breasts enlarged. DiLorenzo
agreed to have the operation. Beforehand, Guccione met with the
plastic surgeon and described to him exactly how he wanted
DiLorenzo's breasts to look. After the operation, DiLorenzo was pre-
sented with the bill for the surgery.
While recuperating, DiLorenzo learned that another actress had
been cast as Caligula's wife. Guccione promised her that she would
have another part, one just as good. This part turned out to be the role
of a slave girl, with no speaking lines.
While feuding with Caligula's director, Tinto Brass, over his failure
to cast "pretty girls" in the film, Guccione approached DiLorenzo and
told her that it was incumbent upon her to rescue Caligula by appear-
ing in some additional scenes that he would secretly edit into the film.
He did not tell her what kind of scenes he had in mind, but he assured
her that he would "personally direct" them and that they would be
"beautiful." 4 Before he slipped her into the studio late one night to film
the scenes, Guccione informed DiLorenzo that these scenes would
require her to perform oral sex on a male actor and simulate lesbian
sex. To her protests that she wanted to be an actress, not "a porno
actress," 5 Guccione replied that by doing the scenes she would save the
film, share in its financial success, and forever "be part of the Penthouse
family." 6 DiLorenzo reluctantly complied with his wishes.
In 1978, Guccione tried unsuccessfully to raise capital to build a
big casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. His anxiety over this project
was intensified by his strong and, as it turned out, prophetic intima-
tions that Caligula was going to bomb. On top of that, his senior
financial advisor, Gerald Kreditor, was balking at the idea of moving
from London to New York City to assume responsibility for Guccione's
troubled finances. Guccione tried to lure Kreditor with offers of gifts
and money, but Kreditor rejected them.
Again Guccione turned to DiLorenzo to rescue him, and again the
rescue scheme involved using her as sexual bait. Guccione planned to
entice Kreditor to move to New York by having DiLorenzo initiate a
sexual relationship with him. When he proposed this idea to
DiLorenzo, she was shocked and emphatically told him that she did not
want to have sex with Kreditor. Guccione responded with the identical
4. Record at 768.
5. Record at 774-75.
6. Record at 773.
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arguments he had used to persuade her to perform in Caligula's explicit
sex scenes. Once again, she reluctantly complied.
For the next eighteen months, Guccione scripted and directed
DiLorenzo in an "affair" with Kreditor, telling her what to do and
when to do it. Finally, DiLorenzo could no longer endure the situation
and terminated the relationship with Kreditor. Guccione responded by
sending DiLorenzo around the country to promote Caligula, introduc-
ing her as a "woman for pornography." 7 Humiliated by the press'
reaction to her performance s DiLorenzo began to understand that the
explicit pornographic scenes in Caligula had sabotaged any hope of an
acting career.
After this promotional trip, Guccione, unsuccessful in raising funds
for the casino project, went to DiLorenzo and ordered her to have sex
with a furniture company owner whom he hoped would back the
project. DiLorenzo cried and protested that she had never even met the
man. Guccione stood over her, waved his finger in her face, and told
her that she "owed him."9 Once again, she submitted.
Guccione then told DiLorenzo that he wanted her to promote
Caligula while touring with him in Japan. DiLorenzo was terrified by
this request because she "didn't know who he would ask her to sleep
with next." 10 It is likely that Guccione was well aware that, in a coun-
try with one of the largest sex industries in the world," l DiLorenzo
would be a valuable commodity. DiLorenzo told him she did not want
to travel to Japan to promote Caligula. Guccione replied that she had
to. She responded, "I'm going to have a nervous breakdown. I can't go
on that tour."12 His answer was to fire her.
Although DiLorenzo's complaint alleged a variety of causes of
action, from breach of contract and fraud to intentional infliction of
emotional harm, the trial court found for the Plaintiff exclusively on
the sexual harassment claim. 13 It awarded her s6o,ooo in compensatory
7. Record at 1487.
8. Record at 857, 1464.
9. Record at 864.
10. Record at 866.
1 I. Yayori Matsui, Trafficking in Women and Prostitution in Japan, WOMEN EMpOWER-
ING WOMEN (Coalition Against Trafficking in Women-Asia, Manila, Phil.), 1993,
at 6 (on file with the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law).
12. Record at 867.
13. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 972 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1990) ("Plaintiff's testimony ... was controverted only by defendant Guccione's
blanket denial that the events took place. I do not believe him."), aff'd as modified,
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damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. Rejecting Guccione's
testimony at trial as incredible, the court held that his acts of pimping
DiLorenzo to his business associates constituted illegal quid pro quo
sexual harassment:
Defendants used the plaintiff in furtherance of their business
as if she were property owned by them. Although the
plaintiffs employment enabled the defendants indirectly to
profit from her physical appearance and acting abilities, it did
not render her a commodity to be leased, sold, traded or
exploited because of her womanhood. Defendants' conduct is
punishable as more than simply a violation of plaintiff's job-
related property rights. It represents a flagrant abuse of power,
violating plaintiff's civil rights and denigrating women as a
class. 14
Guccione and Penthouse appealed both the damages awards and the
trial court's finding of sexual harassment. 15 The Appellate Division
struck down the punitive damages award on the grounds that New
York State Human Rights Law did not specifically provide for them.16
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling.'7 How-
ever, both appellate courts upheld the sexual harassment finding and the
compensatory damages award because they were unpersuaded by Cross-
Appellants' argument that, even if Guccione had pimped DiLorenzo,
she had waived any right to protest such exploitation by working for a
publication like Penthouse.
In the final analysis, the trial court's decision is a real, even if
partial victory for feminism. By crediting the testimony of a woman
exploited by the sex industry and holding her exploiter accountable
under sexual harassment law for subjecting her to forms of pimping,
the court empowered a class of women whose considerable injuries have
been all but ignored by our legal system. However, by exempting
Guccione's pimping of DiLorenzo in the two Caligula scenes from its
583 N.Y.S.2d 213 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
14. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
15. Throughout this brief, the term "Defendant" will be used to refer to Robert Guc-
cione and the term "Cross-Appellants" will be used to refer to both Robert Guc-
cione and Penthouse International Ltd.
16. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215-17 (App. Div. 1992),
affid, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
17. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l. Ltd., 606 N.E.2d 1369, 1371-73 (N.Y. 1992).
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finding of sexual harassment, the court implicitly balanced the free
speech rights of the pornographer against the right of his employee to
be free from sexual harassment and came down on the side of the
pornographer. What the trial court failed to comprehend is that when
the employer is in the business of manufacturing so-called speech, the
employee who embodies that "speech" more than ever requires protec-
tion from sexual harassment.
ARGUMENT
I. THE APPELLATE DIVISION CORRECTLY SUSTAINED THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING OF QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment is "harassment in which a supervisor
demands sexual consideration in exchange for job benefits."1 To estab-
lish an employer's liability under the quid pro quo theory, an employee
must show that "as a result of her response to the harassing conduct,
she 'was deprived of a job benefit . ..' or in some other way sustained
a 'tangible job detriment."19 The sexually harassing employer explicitly
or implicitly conditions employment consequences on the employee's
submission to sexual conduct.2 0 The bottom line of a quid pro quo
claim is that "[t]he employee's reaction" to her employer's request for
sexual favors results in her loss of either a job benefit or the job itself.21
At trial, Plaintiff testified that Defendant demanded she initiate
and carry on a sexual relationship with his chief financial advisor,
Gerald Kreditor, in order to entice Kreditor to move to New York,
after promises of a new house and financial rewards had failed to lure
18. Rudow v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1010
(Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1985), appeal denied, 489
N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1985); accordTomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989-90 (D.C. Cir.
1977); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
32-47 (1979).
19. Watts v. New York City Police Dep't, 724 E Supp. 99, 103 (S.D.N.Y 1989)
(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
20. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 E2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987); Koster v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F. Supp. 848, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
21. Koster, 687 F. Supp. at 861 (quoting Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 721-22
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987)); accord Chamberlin v. 101
Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777. 783 (lst Cir. 1990); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864
F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
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him there. Defendant then orchestrated the "affair" for a period of
eighteen months.22 After the relationship ended, Defendant insisted that
Plaintiff have sex with the owner of an Italian furniture manufacturing
company who Defendant hoped would provide financial backing for his
faltering New Jersey casino project.23 When Defendant demanded that
Plaintiff accompany him to Japan, she refused. Plaintiff knew he would
continue his demands, in an environment in which Plaintiff's resistance
would be impossible, because he was hoping to secure desperately
needed financial support. Plaintiff testified that she was afraid to go on
the tour because "I didn't know who he would ask me to sleep with
next." 24 Through her testimony, Plaintiff established an escalating
pattern of sexual harassment in which Defendant required her to pro-
vide sexual favors to his business associates for his own financial objec-
tives. "[A]s a result of [Plaintiff's] response to the harassing conduct" 25
(i.e., she refused to go to Japan, where she knew Defendant would
demand continued sexual submission) "she 'was deprived of a job
benefit .. -"'26 The Defendant fired her.
Not only did Plaintiff receive the ultimate economic detriment
when she successfully resisted Defendant's harassment-a fact that
clearly shows that compliance with Defendant's sexual demands was an
implicit condition of her employment-but Defendant extracted sexual
favors from her by explicitly promising her job benefits. Defendant
specifically told Plaintiff that he needed her help and that her coopera-
tion would make her "part of the Penthouse family," a phrase that
Defendant had used previously to persuade her to perform two sexually
explicit scenes in Caligula.27 Plaintiff understood exactly what Defen-
dant meant when he promised that she would be "part of the Penthouse
family": Defendant would give her financial security for the rest of her
life. ("I would never have to worry about anything.") 28
In addition to explicitly promising Plaintiff permanent financial
security if she would submit to his sexual demands, Defendant implicit-
ly threatened her with job loss if she refused to carry out his orders.
22. Record at 825-28.
23. Record at 864.
24. Record at 866.
25. Watts, 724 E Supp. at 103.
26. Watts, 724 F. Supp. at 103 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
909 (11th Cir. 1982)).
27. Record at 773.
28. Record at 785.
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When Defendant met with Plaintiff, in order to secure her cooperation
in his scheme to lure Kreditor to the United States, he let her know in
no uncertain terms that her performance of this favor was very impor-
tant to him and "meant a lot to his empire."2 9 For Plaintiff to refuse to
carry out something essential to the Penthouse "empire" would surely
have grave repercussions for her employment by Defendant. The threat
of job loss was made even more explicit when Plaintiff initially refused
Defendant's demand that she have sex with the owner of the furniture
company: Defendant stood over her, pointed his finger at her, and told
her that she "had to do it."30 To hammer home his point, Defendant
then told Plaintiff that she "owed him."31 Thus, Defendant told Plain-
tiff in no uncertain terms that she was indebted to him for her employ-
ment and had to pay off that debt by complying with his order to have
sex with a potential financial backer of his casino project. Cross-Ap-
pellants' contention that "Plaintiff presented absolutely no evidence that
her acquiescence was made a condition of her employment" is squarely
contradicted by the record.32
The fact that Defendant did not carry out his threat until Plaintiff
refused to accompany him to Japan is not surprising. Although Defen-
dant was angry with Plaintiff when she terminated the affair with
Kreditor, it was abundantly clear, after eighteen months, that he could
no more succeed in luring Kreditor to relocate to New York by a sexual
relationship with Plaintiff than by the offers of a big, new house and
more money. Moreover, within weeks Plaintiff submitted, albeit under
protest, to his demand that she have sex with another associate from
whom he wanted favors. 33 Defendant was in dire financial straits with
his Atlantic City casino project and believed that, with Plaintiff as
sexual bait, he could secure the financial backing he urgently needed.' 4
No doubt hoping to ensure Plaintiff's compliance with his demands in
Japan, where the financial stakes were high and Plaintiff would be an
especially desirable commodity,35 Defendant gave her a small raise. It
29. Record at 826.
30. Record at 864.
31. Record at 846.
32. Record at 1240-43.
33. Record at 864, 1246.
34. Record at 862-63, 1241-43.
35. Plaintiff is blond and blue-eyed. In Japan's sex industry, racial characteristics, espe-
cially blond hair and blue eyes, are highly sexualized. One cannot help being struck
by the frequent depictions of Western women in Japanese pornography. The use of
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was not until Plaintiff refused to go with Defendant to Japan that he
realized she would no longer provide the sexual services so useful to his
"empire," and he exacted the ultimate employment consequence.
In this case, there was no significant hiatus between Defendant's
sexual harassment of Plaintiff, her resistance to that harassment, and her
termination by Defendant. Plaintiff ended the sexual relationship with
Kreditor in May 1980; in the summer of that year, Defendant demand-
ed that she sleep with the furniture company owner; and in September
of that year, he fired her. Even if there were such a hiatus, however,
courts have held that a time lag between an employee's resistance to
sexual harassment and the employer's termination of her employment
does not undermine the employee's quid pro quo claim. In Chamberlin
v. 101 Realty, Inc.,36 the First Circuit found that a two-and-one-half
month hiatus between an employer's request for sexual favors (immedi-
ately followed by the employee's rejection of that proposition) and the
termination of the employee's job did not destroy the employee's quid
pro quo claim.37 In Tomkins v. Pub. Service Electric & Gas Co.,38 the
Third Circuit ruled that a "firing" more than one year after the em-
ployer's advance was no bar to a quid pro quo claim. 39 Likewise, in
Barbetta v. Chemlawn Services Corp.,40 a New York district court held,
in a constructive discharge case, that "[t]he passage of time alone [be-
tween the last alleged incident of sexual harassment and Plaintiff's
termination of her employment] is not dispositive."
4 1
In Chamberlin, the First Circuit found direct evidence of quid pro
quo sexual harassment in five instances of the employer's sexually
motivated conduct, none of which were accompanied by employ-
ment-related promises or threats. 42 The court held that quid pro quo
sexual harassment could be inferred from the pattern of employer's
Western women in Japan parallels the use of non-Caucasian women in Western
pornography-to create a greater sense of "otherness" so as to absolve the (majority)
male voyeur of any feeling of responsibility toward the (minority) women portrayed.
See Lesley A. Rimmel, Pornography and Feminism in Japan: Notes from a Gaijin
8-9 (Summer 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Michigan Journal of
Gender & Law).
36. 915 F2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 777, 785 n.10.
38. 568 E2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 1047.
40. 699 F Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
41. Id. at 572.
42. Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 785.
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sexual advances, employee's lack of response, and employee's termina-
tion. In comparison, the facts of de case at bar, replete with explicit
threats and promises by the employer, constitute far clearer evidence of
a job-related quid pro quo.
In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,43 the First Circuit found
direct evidence of quid pro quo sexual harassment in the suggestion by
the chief resident of a medical school that a first-year female resident
... keep a relationship with a high-level resident "in order to ease her
way through [the program]." 44 (Plaintiff rejected his advice and was
ultimately terminated from the program during her second-year of
residency.) These facts directly echo, if somewhat faintly, those of the
instant case in which Plaintiff was ordered by Defendant to have sex
with others, cajoled and threatened into doing so, and abruptly fired
when she resisted his sexual demands.
II. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
SUBJECTED PLAINTIFF TO A SEXUALLY HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT.
In addition to quid pro quo sexual harassment, the trial court's determi-
nation is equally well supported by a hostile environment theory. Hos-
tile environment sexual harassment has been recognized as a violation of
New York Human Rights Law since the holding of Judge Glen in
Rudow v. Comm'n on Human Rights:.45
[Wlhenever an employer or supervisor requires workers to
endure unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, such as
looks, touches, jokes, gestures, innuendos, epithets or proposi-
tions, and such conduct has the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working envi-
ronment, that person is committing sexual harassment in
violation of the Administrative Code. 46
43. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 905-06.
45. 44 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), aff'd 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App.
Div. 1985), appeal denied, 489 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1985).
46. Id. at 1013.
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This definition of a sexually hostile work environment has been em-
ployed by federal courts in Title VII cases in each circuit and was en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson.47
"This kind of sexual harassment... 'implicitly and effectively make[s]
the employee's endurance of sexual intimidation a 'condition' of her
employment.' "
48
A. Defendant's Repeated Remands that Plaintiff Engage in
Sexual Relationships for Defendant's Monetary Gain
Constituted Pervasive and Severe Sexual Harassment.
The Supreme Court held in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson 49 that
"[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment.' "50 Whether an employer's
conduct reaches that degree of severity or pervasiveness must be deter-
mined "in light of 'the record as a whole' and 'the totality of circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred.' "51 To reach a determination of
hostile work environment, "the finder of fact [is legally required to]
examine not only the frequency of the incidents, but the gravity as
well."52 In Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,53 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that two instances of a defendant hanging a noose
over a plaintiff's workplace were sufficient to support her charge of a
racially hostile environment. 54 Hence, although generally, repeated
47. 477 U.S. 57, 66-68 (1986). See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
48. Rudow, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 1011, aff'd, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1985), appeal
denied, 489 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1985) (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
946 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
49. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
50. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
51. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
52. Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th
Cir. 1989).
53. 863 F2d 1503 (lth Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 1511. See also Comment, Employment Discrimination-Sexual Harassment and
Title VII-Female Employees' Claim Alleging Verbal and Physical Advances by a Male
Supervisor Dismissed as Non-Actionable-Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 51 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 148, 164 n.76 (1976) ("Where sexual attentions take an extreme or
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incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment,55 "conduct less
pervasive, but more offensive in form and effect, than slurs and epithets
can so poison a working environment as to render it abusive."' 6
There is no question that Defendant's harassment of Plaintiff was
"continuous and concerted."5T Defendant intimidated Plaintiff into
dispensing sexual favors to his financial advisor throughout an
eighteen-month period. The campaign to entice Kreditor, in and of
itself, is more than sufficient to establish pervasiveness. Courts have
found pervasiveness sufficient to support a claim for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment in cases where the employer's actions were
considerably less prolonged than those of Defendant. In Bennett v. New
York City Department of Corrections,58 there were nine separate inci-
dents, ranging from sexually explicit graffiti to a slap on the buttocks;5 9
in Danna v. New York Telephone Co.,60 sexually explicit graffiti and one
sexually hostile comment;61 in Watts v. New York City Police Depart-
ment,62 two instances of unwanted sexual touching;63 in Ellison v.
Brady,64 three bizarre love letters;65 in Carrero v. New York City Housing
Authority,66 fondling Plaintiff's knee and kissing her neck.67
Defendant's harassment of Plaintiff did not end with the Kreditor
"affair." After its termination, Defendant demanded that Plaintiff
provide sexual favors to another business associate, this one a complete
stranger to her. Far from being "isolated" or "sporadic" incidents,
Defendant's sexual harassment of Plaintiff was repeated and routine, a
pattern and practice of abuse. 68
"The offensiveness of the individual actions complained of is also a
factor to be considered in determining whether such actions are
coercive form.., even one incident may be one too many.").
55. King v. Board of Regents, 898 E2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
56. Watts v. New York City Police Dep't, 724 E Supp. 99, 105, (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
57. Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth., 890 E2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989).
58. 705 F Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
59. Id. at 986.
60. 752 E Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
61. Id. at 612.
62. 724 E Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
63. Id. at 105.
64. 924 E2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 873-74.
66. 890 R2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 578.
68. Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 E2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986).
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pervasive." 69 In the instant case, the trial court's description of
Defendant's conduct toward Plaintiff as "sexual extortion" is an apt
characterization. 70 For eighteen months, Defendant abused his female
employee by trading her to two of his business associates for their
sexual gratification in exchange for his own anticipated financial gain.
Defendant not only perpetuated and condoned the prostituting of
Plaintiff, but he initiated, scripted, supervised, and controlled it by
manipulating her as though she were his property and using her as
sexual consideration in his business transactions. It is difficult to im-
agine a grosser violation of a woman worker's sexuality, integrity,
autonomy, physical being, liberty, dignity, and equality.
Defendant's harassment of Plaintiff was without question "hostile
and offensive enough to adversely affect ... [the] well-being or work
performance" of "a reasonable person facing the same circumstances."
71
Through his harassment of Plaintiff, Defendant turned the conditions
of her workplace into precisely the kind of environment decried by
Justice Goldberg in the landmark hostile racial environment case, Rogers
v. EEOC72 -one "so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers . ... "73
When Defendant's sexual harassment of Plaintiff is evaluated from
the perspective of a "reasonable woman," the standard increasingly
adopted in sexually hostile work environment cases, the offensiveness of
Defendant's conduct is even more extreme and outrageous. 74 For an
employee, particularly a female employee, the experience of being
69. Carrero, 890 F.2d at 578.
70. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l., Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 976 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1990), aff'd, 583 N.Y.S.D. 213 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y.
1992).
71. Watts, 724 E Supp. at 104. Cf. Bennett v. New York City Dep't of Corrections,
705 F. Supp. 979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (employing "reasonable person" standard
in hostile environment case).
72. 454 E2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
73. Id. at 238, cert. denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
74. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[We believe that a
sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systemati-
cally ignore the experiences of women."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); King, 898 F.2d at 537; Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Barbetta v. Chemlawn
Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Note, Sexual
Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1449, 1458-59 (1984).
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traded by an employer for sexual purposes is subjection to offensive
behavior that far exceeds the requirement of being "sufficiently severe
[so as] to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment."75 In Keeping Women in Their Place,76 Pro-
fessor Nadine Taub describes the impact on women workers of being
forced by their employers into conditions of sexual servitude: "The
situation in which a person is asked to exchange sexual services for
continued employment is uniquely disturbing to women. It is a remind-
er, a badge or incident of a servile status, which women are striving to
leave behind." 77
Requiring a woman to trade her body, her sexual integrity, and her
human dignity for economic survival is a profoundly humiliating,
demeaning, and degrading act of abuse.78 The reduction of women
workers to sexual commodities perpetuates and reinforces the stereotyp-
ing of female employees that sexual harassment law both recognizes as
an obstacle to women's equality in the workplace and is intended to
eradicate.79 Although too often employers sexually harass their female
employees for their own sexual gratification, few carry their assault on a
woman worker's dignity to the lengths that Defendant did in this case,
callously pimping Plaintiff to his business associates in the hope of
receiving economic benefits from the exchange.
In Campbell v. Kansas State University,80 the court held that a
supervisor's act of slapping a female employee on the buttocks coupled
with a verbal threat to repeat the action was "sufficiently severe to
constitute actionable sexual harassment." 8' The court reasoned: "[De-
fendant's] behavior robbed the plaintiff of her self-esteem at the
75. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982)).
76. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. Rev., 345 (1980).
77. Taub, supra note 76, at 368.
78. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981); MACKNNON, supra
note 18, at 47 ("Like women who are raped, sexually harassed women feel humiliat-
ed, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed, and cheap, as well as angry."); U.S. MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
AN UPDATE 41 (1988).
79. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483 ("Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetua-
tion of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage
employment opportunities for women." (citing Note, supra note 74, at 1455)).
8o. 780 F. Supp. 755 (D. Kan. 1991).
81. Id. at 762.
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workplace; she was demeaned, degraded and humiliated.... In this day
of heightened sensitivity to sexual harassment and a woman's rights in
the workplace, this court finds defendant's behavior wholly unaccept-
able . "82 If a slap on the buttocks demeans, degrades, and humili-
ates a woman worker, robbing her of her self-esteem, what does it do to
her sense of self to be exploited by her employer as sexual bait in his
financial wheeling and dealing?
B. The Totality of the Circumstances and the Record as a
Whole Establish that Defendant Subjected Plaintiff to a
Sexually Hostile Workplace.
In evaluating the hostility and abusiveness of a workplace, the trier of
fact must analyze the alleged instances of sexual harassment "in light of
'the record as a whole' and 'the totality of circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
incidents occurred.' "83 Indeed, "one of the critical inquiries in a hostile
environment claim must be the environment. Evidence of a general
work atmosphere ... is an important factor in evaluating the claim."
84
Although the trial court limited its findings of sexual harassment to
only Defendant's most egregious abuses of Plaintiff, the entire pattern
of conduct toward her that emerged at trial must be taken into con-
sideration in assessing the hostility of her workplace.
Throughout the course of their relationship as employer and
employee, Defendant used Plaintiff as a sexual plaything, domestic
servant, and sexual commodity for his economic gain, manipulating her
to do his bidding by exploiting her lack of experience and her economic
vulnerability. At the start of their employment relationship, Defendant
staked his claim on Plaintiff by seducing her and pressuring her to sign
a management contract that required her to be guided by his advice,
but he had no intention of carrying out its terms.35 When Defendant
brought Plaintiff to New York, purportedly to promote her career as a
model and actress, he moved her first into the dressing room adjoining
his bedroom and then into a room in the basement without a
82. Campbell, 780 . Supp. at 762.
83. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(b) (1985)). See also Vance, 863
F.2d at 1510 ("[Each alleged incident of harassment [need not be] judged in a
vacuum.").
84. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
85. Record at 645-75.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
telephone, where she was at his beck and call, working six- to seven-day
weeks, walking his dog, babysitting his children, assisting him with his
editorial duties, and sexually servicing him.
86
Between brief stints posing for Penthouse, Plaintiff promoted Pent-
house by appearing at record stores, shopping center openings, and
automobile shows, wearing the obligatory costume, a French maid
uniform with a sash that read "Penthouse Pet."87 Plaintiff also promoted
Penthouse on Defense Department sponsored tours, entertaining the
troops with a sexually suggestive comedy routine written by a Penthouse
writer and answering media questions with a script written by Defen-
dant.88 Promising Plaintiff an important role in Caligula, Defendant
ordered her to surgically enlarge her breasts, instructing the surgeon
before the operation precisely how he wanted Plaintiff's breasts to
appear.89 The important role in Caligula ended up being two extremely
graphic sexual scenes that Defendant bullied Plaintiff into performing
to the detriment of any potential acting career and her self-esteem.9 ° All
the while, Defendant kept Plaintiff on a modest retainer that reinforced
her economic dependence on him and her submission to his will. Given
these facts, for the Dissent to the Appellate Division's opinion below to
characterize Plaintiff's seven-year history of sexual servitude at Penthouse
as "r[iding] the roller coaster of pleasure, fame and recognition" exposes
stunning insensitivity to gross sexual exploitation and embraces a
"blame the victim" point of view.91 The work environment Defendant
imposed on Plaintiff from the beginning of her employment at Pent-
house was a set up for the sexual harassment he ultimately inflicted on
her.
86. Record at 1028, 1446, 1502, 1505.
87. Record at 692, 1456.
88. The first question in the script was "Do you have self-respect?" to which Plaintiff
was instructed to answer, "Of course ... My pictures are like works of art."
Another question was whether Plaintiff felt exploited, to which she was to answer,
"I'm getting paid for what I do." A third question was whether Penthouse was
pornographic; Plaintiff was told to answer "war is pornographic." Record at
1451-59.
89. Record at 742-45.
90. Record at 647-49, 710, 712.
91. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 224 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd,
606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
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III. PLAINTIFF PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S
HARASSMENT WAS UNWELCOME.
In Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson,92 the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' "93 The Court emphasized that an
employee who voluntarily participates in workplace sexual activity has a
cause of action for sexual harassment as long as she can demonstrate
that the sexual advances at issue were unwelcome to her. 94 Although
she eventually succumbed to Defendant's demands, Plaintiff communi-
cated directly and emphatically to Defendant how offensive and unde-
sirable they were to her. 95 When Defendant insisted that Plaintiff
initiate a sexual relationship with his financial advisor, she expressed
shock and told him that she did not want to.96 This sexual activity was
so repugnant to Plaintiff that to endure it she had to anaesthetize
herself.97 Plaintiff testified at trial, "I did not want to sleep with him.
Guccione forced me to sleep with him."98 Plaintiff was even more
emphatic in her expression of opposition to and distress at Defendant's
demand that she have sex with the owner of the furniture manufactur-
ing company: "I started crying. I had never even met the man." 99
Defendant escalated the pressure in reaction to her display of resistance:
"He said I had to do this for him, that I owed him."' 00 Plaintiff's
strongest assertion of the unwelcomeness of Defendant's sexual harass-
ment was her insistence that she was "going to have a nervous break-
down," if forced to accompany Defendant to Japan, followed by her
final refusal to go. 1' 1 Defendant reacted to this resistance by firing
her.102 This record directly contradicts Cross-Appellants' assertion that
"Plaintiff offered no proof of conduct that would have indicated [to
92. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
93. Id. at 68 (quoting 29 C.ER. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
94. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
95. Record at 826, 864.
96. Record at 826.
97. In order to endure the sex with Kreditor, Plaintiff drank. Record at 1492.
98. Record at 1470.
99. Record at 864.
io. Record at 864.
101. Record at 867.
102. Record at 867.
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Defendant] that [his sexual machinations] would be unwelcome." 103
There is no legal requirement that a sexual harassment plaintiff
offer proof of efforts to resist sexual harassment, as Cross-Appellants
suggest in their brief.'0 4 To the contrary, courts have repeatedly stated
that "it is especially important to allow 'women to sue to prevent sexual
harassment without having to prove that they resisted the harassment
.... ' "105 The obvious rationale behind the fact that voluntariness is no
defense to a sexual harassment claim was succinctly stated by the court
in Rudow: "the power imbalance between employer and employee . . .
often makes a worker in need of her job feel she must swallow such
indignities." 10 6 In Chamberlin v. 1 Realty, Inc.,107 the First Circuit ex-
panded on this observation:
[T]he perspective of the factfinder evaluating the welcomeness
of sexual overtures ... must take account of the fact that the
employee may reasonably perceive that her recourse to more
emphatic means of communicating the unwelcomeness of the
supervisor's sexual advances... may prompt the termination
of her employment, especially when the sexual overtures are
made by the owner of the firm.108
Plaintiff's inability to resist Defendant's sexual extortion was a
function of the power differential between Defendant and Plaintiff, a
power imbalance far more extreme than that of the typical
employer-employee relationship. Not simply "the owner of the firm,"
Defendant was a multi-millionaire, worldly and famous at the time he
hired Plaintiff.109 By contrast, she was an unknown twenty-year-old, a
high school dropout, and a former runaway who, for five years prior to
meeting Defendant, had been engaged in a struggle for physical and
material survival. Although Defendant repeatedly promised to advance
103. Record at 867.
104. Brief for Cross-Appellants at 26-27, Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 606 N.E.2d
1369 (N.Y. 1992) (No. 269).
1o5. Rudow v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1011
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)), aff'd, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1985), appeal denied, 489 N.E.2d
1302 (N.Y. 1985).
106. Rudow, 474 N.YS.2d at 1008.
107. 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
1o8. Id. at 784.
109. Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 784.
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Plaintiff in her career and her life, in reality, he rendered her more and
more powerless during the course of their relationship, fostering her
financial dependence on him by undermining alternative sources of
income (including an acting career) and eroding her self-esteem through
his demand that she participate in increasingly degrading pornography.
By the time Defendant began to insist that Plaintiff sell sexual favors to
his business associates, "he held a position of power over her that, in
combination with his unwelcome sexual [demands], was tantamount to
coercion." 110
Cross-Appellants distort and misapply the law when they use a
"totality of the circumstances" analysis to dredge up irrelevant and
unreliable allegations to smear Plaintiff as a prostitute who welcomed
Defendant's pimping.111 "[T]otality of the circumstances" is the stan-
dard courts have traditionally used in hostile environment cases to
evaluate the entire environment of an alleged sexual or racial harasser's
workplace to determine "[w]hether sexual harassment at [that]
workplace is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the
psychological well being of employees. " 112 In the vast majority of cases,
this analysis has been used to evaluate the hostility and abusiveness of
the defendant-employer's conduct and workplace. Hence, in Snell v.
Suffolk County,113 the Second Circuit articulated the standard ("Wheth-
er racial acrimony in a particular institution is 'sufficiently pervasive' to
constitute a Title VII violation is to be determined from the totality of
the circumstances.") 114 and then applied it to the evidence of racial ha-
rassment, i.e., "the proliferation of demeaning literature and epi-
thets."115 Other cases in which courts have used a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" analysis to evaluate the severity and pervasiveness of an
employer's harassing acts include Campbell v. Kansas University' 16
("Whether sexual harassment is sufficiently pervasive or severe to create
110. Carrero v. Housing Auth., 890 E2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989).
III. At that, Penthouse called as a witness a woman who over a decade before had been
a roommate of Plaintiff's sister. Despite the fact that this witness had met Plaintiff
only once, she testified that she knew her to be a prostitute. She also testified that
she had stolen Plaintiff's address book and found the name of a pimp in it. Record
at 2198-233, 1003, 1076, 3143.
112. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
113. 782 E2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 1103 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 904 (l1th Cir.
1982)).
115. Snell, 782 E2d at 1103.
116. 780 F. Supp. 755 (D. Kan. 1991).
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a hostile working environment must be determined from the totality of
the circumstances."); 1 7 Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.118 ("Whether the
sexual conduct complained of is sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile
or offensive work environment must be determined from the totality of
the circumstances.");' 19 Babcock v. Frank120 ("[W]hether conduct reach-
es that threshold of severity or pervasiveness is a determination that
must be based on the 'totality of circumstances,' which must promise
more than minor 'isolated incidents' or 'casual comments' that express
harassment or hostility.");121 and Barbetta v. Chemlawn Services Corp. 1
22
("Casual comments .. .are insufficient. Whether sexual harassment is
'sufficiently pervasive' to constitute a Title VII violation is to be deter-
mined from the totality of the circumstances."). 123 The only instance
Amici can locate of a decision stating that a "totality of the circum-
stances" analysis should be used to scrutinize the character and back-
ground of a plaintiff is the misguided majority opinion of the Sixth
Circuit in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.124 This is the approach on
which the dissent to the decision of the Appellate Division seizes to
bludgeon Plaintiff for the hardship of her teenage years and her ex-
ploitation by Defendant. 125
Attempting to shift the focus of this appeal from the conduct of
the Defendant to the character of his victim, Cross-Appellants mis-
characterize the law in order to wage a no-holds-barred character assas-
sination campaign against Plaintiff.126 Cross-Appellants attack Plaintiff
117. Id. at 761 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 E2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982)).
118. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 1413 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 E2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
120. 729 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
121. Id. at 288 (citing Watts v. New York City Police Dep't, 724 F. Supp. 99, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)); Snell, 782 F.2d at 1103.
122. 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
123. Id. at 572 (citing Snell v. Suffolk, 782 E2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986)).
124. 805 F2d at 620, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
125. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 223 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd,
606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992). Like the Sixth Circuit majority in Rabidue, Judge
Wallach, in his dissent, interprets a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to mean
not an examination of the Plaintiff's work environment but a ruthless dissection of
the Plaintiff's "background and experience." Applying this standard to Plaintiff, he
remarks, "[S]he was no stranger to topless bars and ... roles calling for her ap-
pearance in a state of undress." Id. He indicates that such a woman could not have
been injured by Guccione's alleged actions. Id.
126. Brief for Cross-Appellants at point I.
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for jobs she took to survive as a teenage runaway, years before she even
met Defendant and approximately a decade before he began to sexually
harass her by requiring her to dispense sexual favors to his business
associates.12 7 Cross-Appellants assert that because Plaintiff posed for
Penthouse and succumbed to Defendant's demand that she perform in
sexually explicit scenes in Caligula, it follows that she welcomed and
deserved his demands that she have sexual relationships with his col-
leagues.12 8 Cross-Appellants cite an unsubstantiated claim made by a
Penthouse employee on retainer for Penthouse at the time she testified as
Penthouse's witness. 129 Cross-Appellants try to smear Plaintiff as a pros-
titute by referring to the confused and incredible testimony of another
Penthouse witness, a former roommate of Plaintiff's sister, whose entire
acquaintance with Plaintiff consisted of a weekend visit. This visit took
place before Plaintiff had even met Defendant and ended when Plaintiff
ordered her to leave.13
This evidence is not only flimsy and unreliable, it is irrelevant.
Courts have repeatedly held that a plaintiff's history and character are
irrelevant to an inquiry into sexual discrimination in the workplace.' 31
In Swentek v. US AIR, Inc.,132 the Fourth Circuit held that evidence
that the plaintiff engaged in sexual pranks, made sexual propositions,
and conducted obscenity-laced conversations about sex with co-workers
did not waive her legal protection against unwelcome harassment in the
workplace. 33 The Swentek court stated:
We note at the outset that the trial court misconstrued what
constitutes unwelcome sexual harassment. It held that
[Plaintiff]'s own past conduct and use of foul language meant
127. Brief for Cross-Appellants at point I.
128. Brief for Cross-Appellants at point I.
129. Lori Wagner testified that Plaintiff bragged about her sexual performance in
Caligula. Record at 2432.
130. Record at 1235-56, 2929.
131. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) ("It is not our job to
review the evidence and decide that the negative reactions to [Plaintiff] were based
on reality; our perception of [Plaintiff's] character is irrelevant."); Rabidue, 805
F.2d at 625 (Keith, J., dissenting) ("The record establishes plaintiff possessed
negative personal traits. These traits did not, however, justifr the sex-based disparate
treatment .... ") cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Danna v. New York Tel. Co.,
752 F. Supp. 594, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("T]his court is not here to evaluate
[Plaintiffl's behavior, but [Defendant]'s.").
132. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 557.
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that [Defendant]'s comments were "not unwelcome" even
though she told [him] to leave her alone .... Plaintiff's use
of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting
does not waive "her legal protections against unwelcome
harassment." 134
The issue in the instant appeal is not whether Plaintiff "is nice" or has
a "respectable" background but whether the Appellate Division's deci-
sion upholding the trial court's finding of sexual harassment is support-
ed by sufficient evidence. Cross-Appellants' smear of Plaintiff is a
smokescreen intended to distract this court from its task.
In addition to the irrelevance of Cross-Appellants' attack on Plain-
tiff's character, there are compelling policy reasons for the court to
repudiate such a tactic. Savaging a sexual harassment plaintiff's charac-
ter by bringing up ancient allegations about her work history or insinu-
ating that she is a prostitute who welcomes sexual exploitation is com-
parable to the increasingly discredited strategy, long used by defense
lawyers in rape cases, of smearing victims as promiscuous, immoral, and
"asking for it." 13 5 In both situations, the implication is the same: "'It
never happened, and what's more they deserve it.' "136 The humiliation
that rape victims were subjected to during trial was so severe and the
chilling effect on rape reports so great that states finally enacted rape
shield laws to prohibit the use of evidence about the victim's sexual
history. 137 If sexual harassment defendants succeed with comparable
smear tactics, women victimized by sexual abuse in the workplace will
be reluctant to come forward: "[A] firm rule in sexual harassment trials
against the introduction of evidence concerning a victim's sexual con-
duct would prevent defendants from playing upon sexist prejudice by
invoking the outmoded stereotype of the 'bad' or 'fallen' woman who
134. Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir.
1983)).
135. This defense is most often employed in cases in which the complainant knew the
defendant prior to the attack. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1088
(1986). As a criminal defense attorney working in New York City, however, I have
seen it employed by defense attorneys even in cases of stranger rape. During the
cross-examination the defendant will ask the complainant whether she is a pros-
titute; her denials are met with a wink to the jury.
136. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977) (quoting RAPE VICTIMOLOGY xv (L. Schultz ed. 1975)).
137. See Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 100, 284 (1986) (reviewing Meritor Savings
Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
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asks for abuse."
138
A recent example of such stereotyping occurred in October 1991,
when Professor Anita Hill testified before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee at the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas. 139 Although Professor Hill's background and work experiences
were very different from Plaintiff's, her character was similarly smeared
by misogynistic stereotypes of a sexual nature. Where Professor Hill was
reviled as a mentally unbalanced sexual fantasizer out to seek revenge
against the man who had sexually rejected her,140 Plaintiff is denigrated
by Cross-Appellants as a loose woman who welcomed being pimped by
Defendant to his associates.
While denigrating sexual harassment plaintiffs as "bad women"
who get what they ask for dissuades all victims from bringing claims,
the chilling effect of such a tactic is particularly great on those women
who, like Plaintiff, have histories of deprivation and exploitation. In
counseling victims of sexual abuse, Amici have learned that women with
such histories are more susceptible to later incidents of sexual violence
and exploitation than are women from more fortunate backgrounds.
141
Early experiences of abuse, deprivation, and/or exploitation often leave
women ill-equipped to recognize and avoid potentially abusive situa-
tions.142 Such experiences also often render women and girls economi-
cally and psychologically vulnerable to sexual predators. 143 A runaway
from a broken home who, at the tender age of fifteen, lost the guid-
ance, protection, and material support of her family, Plaintiff was
138. Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 284.
139. See generally TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES: THE
INSIDE STORY OF CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND A SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION (1992).
140. Homi K. Bhabha, A Good Judge of Character: Men Metaphors and the Common
Culture, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 248 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992).
141. See D. RUSSELL, RAPE, CHILD SExUAL ABUSE AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 287
(1984).
142. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 111 (1992) ("Almost inevitably,
the survivor has great difficulty protecting herself in the context of intimate
relationships. Her desperate longing for nurturance and care makes it difficult to
establish safe and appropriate boundaries with others. Her tendency to denigrate
herself and to idealize those to whom she becomes attached further clouds her
judgment. Her empathic attunement to the wishes of others and her automatic,
often unconscious habits of Obedience also make her vulnerable to anyone in a
position of power or authority.").
143. HERMAN, supra note 142, at 111.
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particularly susceptible to sexual exploitation. 144 It is ironic that
Cross-Appellants attack Plaintiff's credibility by evoking the very
history that rendered her vulnerable to Defendant's sexual depredation.
Permitting defendants in sexual harassment cases to try to destroy
plaintiffs' credibility by engaging in irrelevant personal attacks gives
abusers license to continue to prey on the most disadvantaged women.
Women workers with histories like Plaintiff's deserve no less protection
under the law than women who mature and work in supportive and
protective environments.
IV. PLAINTIFF DID NOT "ASSUME THE RISK" OF A SEXUALLY
HOSTILE WORKPLACE.
For women employed in the sexual entertainment industry, the need for
meaningful legal protection against all forms of sexual abuse, including
sexual harassment, cannot be overstated. In his concurrence to the
Appellate Division's opinion, Justice Kassal points to the plight of
women working under such conditions and their urgent need for legal
recourse against sexual harassment:
As the trial court observed, "Sexual slavery was not a part
of plaintiff's job description," despite the fact that her em-
ployment involved the commercial exploitation of her physical
appearance. Indeed, plaintiff's very occupation and back-
ground rendered her especially vulnerable to sexual exploita-
tion. The sexual exploitation and harassment found to have
occurred by the trier of fact, which took the form of coercive
sexual relationships designed to further Guccione's financial
interests, subjected plaintiff to levels of humiliation and degra-
dation that no civilized society should tolerate.
145
In this case, the trial court stated, "[p]rotections against sexual harass-
ment are arguably more necessary in a workplace permeated by concep-
tions of women as sex objects" 146 and stressed that "[w]hen there is a
significant potential for discriminatory abuse of power by an employer,
144. Record at 594-600.
145. 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (quoting Thoreson v. Penthouse
Int'l Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990)), aff k 563 N.Y.S.2d
968 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990), aff'd, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
146. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
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the need for an effective deterrent to enforce public policy is even
greater." 147 Both the trial court and the concurring justice emphasize
that Defendant's exploitation of Plaintiff in Penthouse and Caligula did
not give him license to sexually harass her by requiring her to have
sexual relationships to promote his business interests. As Judge Wilke
said, "The offensiveness of defendant's conduct is not mitigated by the
fact that plaintiff's job as a model and actress for Penthouse involved, in
part, the commercial exploitation of her physical appearance." 148
Amicus, The National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (NCASA),
provides crisis counseling to women victimized by sexual abuse, some of
whom work in the sexual entertainment industry. NCASA has learned
that women employed in pornography and related businesses are ex-
traordinarily susceptible to sexual abuse. NCASA has treated and served
as an advocate for women performers who have been sexually harassed,
like Plaintiff, by being pressured or forced by their employers or super-
visors to perform unwanted sexual acts with the employers' associates or
customers. 149 If remedies against sexual harassment are unavailable to
these women, sexual abuse at the hands of their employers will continue
and grow even more severe.
Implicit in Cross-Appellants' brief, as evidenced by the repeated
use of statements like "[Plaintiff] eagerly sought to associate with Pent-
house to exploit her good looks for profit," 150 is the notion that by
accepting sexually exploitative employment at Penthouse, Plaintiff as-
sumed the risk of the most extreme forms of sexual denigration and
abuse, including sexual servitude. What is implicit in Cross-Appellants'
brief is made explicit by the dissent to the Appellate Division's decision,
who contends that Plaintiff should not have prevailed on her sexual
harassment claim because she should have known of "Defendant's
notoriety as a leading publisher in the sex industry" when she agreed to
work for Penthouse, therefore, she assumed the risk of the sexual harass-
ment to which she was subjected in that "sex-oriented" atmosphere. 151
For this proposition, the dissent cites Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.
152
147. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
148. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
149. See Evelina Giobbe, Report to the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women (April
1991).
150. Brief for Cross-Appellants at 5-8.
151. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 223 (App. Div. 1992),
afftd, 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
152. 805 E2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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in which the majority held that a workplace pervaded by anti-female
obscenities, demeaning visual displays of nude and partially clad wom-
en, and vicious sexual slurs was not sexually hostile because it pre-
existed plaintiff's entrance into the workplace. 153 The Rabidue court's
argument that workers assume the risk of sexually hostile environments
has been squarely rejected by courts and legal scholars alike.154 In
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,155 the court attacked the Rabidue
majority's "social context" reasoning as "lack[ing] a sound analytical
basis" and argued that it "cannot be squared with [the promise of] Title
VII."''56 In contrast, the highly influential and widely quoted Rabidue
dissent squarely rejected the notion "that a woman assumes the risk of
working in an abusive, anti-female environment."1 57 The dissent went
on to declare that "even sex industry employees are protected under
[the law] from non-job-related sexual demands, language or other of-
fensive behavior by supervisors or co-workers .... no woman should be
subjected to an environment where her sexual dignity and reasonable
sensibilities are visually, verbally or physically assaulted .... 3158
Imported from the tort law of negligence, assumption of risk was
once widely used by employers defending themselves against lawsuits
brought by injured employees.' 59 The defense 'was abolished by Con-
gress in 1939 because it left workers seeking recovery for workplace
injuries hopelessly disadvantaged and promoted negligence and
153. Id. at 620.
154. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990);
Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988); Snell v. Suffolk
County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp.,
669 F. Supp. 569, 573, n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 115 (1987); K. Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAN. L. REv. 1183, 1212 n.18 (1989);
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177, 1201-10 (1990).
155. 760 E Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
156. Id. at 1526.
157. Rabidue, 805 E2d at 626.
158. Rabidue, 805 E2d at 626. See also Lipsett, 864 E2d at 905; Robinson, 760 F. Supp.
at 1525-27; Barbetta, 669 F. Supp. at 573 n.2; Ehrenreich, supra note 154, at
1201-10.
159. For example, Lord Bromwell took the following position in a case in which a
worker was injured when a stone that was being lifted over his head in the course
of employment fell and hit him. The plaintiff here thought the pay was worth the
risk, and did not bargain for a compensation if hurt: in effect, he undertook the
word with its risks for his wages and no more. Smith v. Baker & Sons 1891 App.
Cas. 325, 344.
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exploitation by employers.160 Cross-Appellants' attempt to suggest that
Plaintiff assumed the risk of Defendant's abuse by accepting
employment at Penthouse is a throwback to an era in which employees
were accorded no meaningful legal protection.161
Cross-Appellants are attempting to use Defendant's creation and
perpetuation of a work environment, in which the sexual exploitation of
women is the work product, as a shield against liability. If this
"assumption of risk" defense were to be accepted, it would be
devastating to women workers in conditions like those endured by
Plaintiff; Defendant and others in his position would have unrestrained
license to sexually abuse their female employees. Amici urge this court
to reject Cross-Appellants' "assumption of risk" smokescreen and to
embrace the principle suggested by the trial court below: No form of
employment "constitute[s] a waiver of [a woman s] right to be free from
sexual harassment in the workplace."
162
16o. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1988).
161. "[Tl]he traditional law of tort ... cannot be imported wholesale into the law of
employment discrimination without significantly undercutting its effectiveness."
Taub, supra note 76, at 378 n.153.
162. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 976 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1990) (emphasis added), aff'd, 583 N.Y.S.2d 213 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd, 606
N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).

